The term "rivalry" entered international relations theory to explain the occurrence of disproportionately high levels of armed conflict between the same pairs of states. It has been defined rivalry by security-past or potential conflict. Currently, the literature has us explaining the occurrence of conflict at best by states' self-stated proneness to engage in it, and at worst by their having engaged in it already. This constitutes a serious tautological error; the phenomenon we venture to explain defines that which we claim explains it. Since its inception, rivalry has undergone some dramatic and useful changes to remedy this ailment; still, the need for rivalry to have its own definition apart from the occurrence of militarized interstate dispute (MID), even potential conflict, persists in the literature.
In this essay, I outline the concept of rivalry as it currently stands, its foundational elements and evolution, and I propose a broader conceptualization of rivalry that promises to explain armed conflict between states that previous models fail to recognize as resulting from rivalry. I proceed as follows: First, I evaluate the current working definitions and conceptualizations of interstate rivalry. Second, I explore two cases in which the non-military facets of rivalry led to conflict between states. For the time period in question, both of these dyads are missed by all existing rivalry datasets. Finally, I outline the utility of the concept of rivalry for explaining conflict, asserting that, in seeking to explain conflict, rivalry cannot be defined only by conflict, as current authors continue to do.
1, 2, 3 I put forth a new definition, reorienting the concept towards interstate competition on various fronts to yield potentially better predictive and explanatory abilities. I argue that the concept of rivalry should rest on relations between states partially separate from armed conflict. In other words, the "high probability of serious conflict or crisis" 4 should be stripped from the working definition. In order to make a non-tautological argument that rivalries are more likely to engage in armed conflict than nonrivalries, we must cease defining them as the dyads that are likely to do so. The data must speak for itself. It is a simple critique, and to fix it would require many layers of revision. I propose a continuous classification of rivalry that includes quantifiable international geographic, economic, diplomatic, and identity-related points of tension, in addition to military history between countries.
RIVALRY AS IT STANDS
Rivalry emerged in the peace and conflict literature to highlight the tendency of recent history's
MIDs and wars to be fought disproportionately between the same few dyads. 5 This observation implied serious modifications to structural theories of war, which insist that all states are functionally identical in the international environment, 6 but by itself both this observation and the novel concept of "enduring rivalries" explain conflict relatively little. The root of the problem is in the definition and stance of classification. "Enduring rivalries" for Diehl are "those in which two nations engage in at least three militarized disputes within a period of fifteen
This arbitrary classification of rivalries set off a still ongoing disagreement of which dyads should make the list of international rivalries and why. Though the definition has changed 4 Ibid., p.3 5 Diehl, 1985 . "Contiguity and Military Escalation in Major Power Rivalries, 1816 -1980 Waltz, 1979 . Theory of International Politics 7 Diehl, 1985. "Contiguity and Military Escalation," p.1204 relatively little-"…a pair of states [that] I point out these discrepancies not to cast doubt upon any particular method of selection, but to demonstrate how the main drive of the rivalry discourse has been overly concerned with mere classification of specific instances of rivalry-it has not treated rivalry substantively. It has been based on largely arbitrary determinants-number, duration, and frequency of disputes, or the time between the first and last occurrence of dispute. 19 For the most part, it has also been entirely dependent on the outbreak of conflict, and even then, the identification of rivalry in most definitions is retrospective, undetectable until the first dispute, at earliest. In their critical "hot hands" analysis, Gartzke and Simon highlight this problem with rivalry theories' utility: "All enduring rivalries must begin in an initial dispute…other theoretical explanations for international conflict must be used to account for initial disputes in series." 20 A definition of rivalry as conflict precludes the possibility to explain conflict's occurrence. The utility of rivalry lies in its recognition that the accumulation of grievances between states can cause them to interpret their interactions more distrustfully than normal. This causes the frequent outbreak of conflict between them. This simple characterization is intuitive enough, but it misses an important detail: grievances come from more places than just violent interaction. Soured economic ties and diplomatic betrayal are poignant sources of grief, and capable of generating 17 Vasquez, 1996 . "Distinguishing Rivals," p.533 18 Colaresi et al, 2007. Strategic Rivals, p.32 19 Goertz and Diehl, 1993. "Power Differentials and War in Rival Dyads," 20 Gartzke and Simon, 1999. "Hot Hands," p.785 security dilemmas. We cannot use the outcome to define the unit of analysis. Such a definition only looks at the last occurrence in a series, even when dynamics many would recognize as rivalrous alter interstate relations prior to the fall of the last domino-the outbreak of conflict. Brecher and James, 1988 . "Patterns of Crisis Management" 24 Thompson, 1995. "Principal Rivalries," p.197 25 Colaresi et al, 2007 . Strategic Rivalries 26 Mitchell and Thies, 2011. "Issue Rivalries," p.231 by past occurrence of conflict alone, especially if those conflicts must be related, constitutes a problem large enough to prevent useful utilization of the concept at all. Their analysis and reconfiguration of rivalry rests on the question, "Must relationships become sufficiently militarized before we recognize it as a rivalry?" 27 In their answer, they maintain that "strategic rivalries are very much about conflict," 28 but instead of tabulating past MIDs, as the past measures had, they use the official stated positions of national leaders. "Beginning and ending dates are keyed as much as possible to the timing of evidence about the onset of explicit threat, competitor, and enemy perceptions on the part of decision-makers." 29 They strip the term of its need for a minimum duration, and they adopt an elevated level of skepticism about when a rivalry can be said to end, but in the end they maintain the primary elements that have been used to classify rivalry thus far. states cease to identify each other as enemies, but the rivalry persists, as they argue, then it must be classified as silent. However, in their framework, the rivalry still must have been born in militarized conflict. Thus, even though they make a peripheral acknowledgement of the possibility of unrequited rivalry-only after it has already bubbled up in the form of military dispute-and, in so doing allow for rivalries to carry on silently, they still fail to grant the existence of a silent or unrequited rivalry before the initial outbreak of conflict. Consequently, they also fail to classify any grievances between states that take forms other than military clash to contribute to the rivalry dynamic.
The reason silent and unrequited rivalries might be largely disallowed in the current literature is that the determination of rivalry itself is dyadic. So far, all evaluations of and based upon rivalry have taken the unit of analysis to be the pair of states, the dyad, rather than either state and its perceptions and actions. Following this trend do Maoz and Mor classify a dyad as a rivalry even when only one side perceives and engenders the continuance thereof. Within the current rivalry paradigm, perhaps this is necessary, but the oddity of a supposedly dyadic 43 Maoz and Mor, 2002. Bound by Struggle, p.6 relationship being determined by the actions of only one side of that dyad seems to call for a reevaluation of the dyadic method.
Equally implicated in this oddity is the binary nature of the determination of rivalries.
Without exception, all authors who have written on interstate rivalry so far have come to count all dyads since 1816 as either rivalrous or not-1 or 0. There is no allowance for the potential concept of the escalation of rivalry-possibly preceding both militarized conflict and establishment of contentious issues-between countries. Hence, neither is there a concept of various degrees of rivalry in the minds of one or more decision-makers involved. In establishing their three categories of rivalry, Mitchell and Thies 44 do start to bestow rivalry with a multidimensional existence; still, doubling the possible configurations of rivalry from two to four does little to address the concerns outlined here, especially since their determination is strictly dyadic.
A final concern with the concept of rivalry as it stands concerns the role of state's constituencies in influencing the potential level of rivalry between states. Following the rivalry forbears, Colaresi et al's method of identifying rivalries insists on using only the statements and perceptions of government officials. "Unless they control the government, constituency views are not considered the same as those of the principal decision-makers." 45 Excluding the base of a state, whether it consists of a democratic citizenry or an autocratic support base, blinds us to potential sources of contentious issues in the form of nationalist, economic, or other forms of competition between national groups. As stated before, Mitchell and Thies make the same decision, so that rivalries are "based on explicit evidence of diplomatic contention involving official representatives…" 46 This decision to discard constituent views within countries, whether parties or mass opinion, must be justified for more than the simple sake of parsimony, since there is ample evidence that dynamics within the state of either rivalry member may contribute to the development of both the contentious issues and the decisions to escalate. Valeriano, 2012. "Becoming Rivalries," p.64 Korea, and "Takeshima" to Japan. 60 I will use the English name here to evade casting an opinion on the subject, as well as to remind the reader that the territory in question is less than one-fifth of a square kilometer in area, or about 46 acres. 61 The two minuscule islands have no natural resources and sit above no known mineral wealth, though they do bring access to fishing grounds. However, this dispute is not predicated on material riches by anyone's account; rather it is the embodiment of a nationalist rivalry between Korea and Japan that has persisted throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
Korea administers the islands, ferrying 1800 citizens there daily to set foot on the islands, take photos, and generally rack up the tally of South Koreans who have been there. 62 Choe relays the sentiments of a South Korean Coast Guard Captain:
"'If the Japanese try to take this island from us, we will fight to the end…If we run out of firepower, we will ram our ship against the intruders…Our national pride is at stake'…Passengers on [the captains'] ship are shown an animated film in which a gigantic Robot Taekwon V figure soars up out of sea and routs Japanese pirates trying to invade Dokdo."
63
From the perspective of at least some Koreans, the Japanese claims represent a realistic, if faint, threat to sovereignty and national pride, enough to ponder the possibility of military action. Trade tension continued to escalate as Kenya ratcheted up tariffs on Ugandan sugar imports and even began impounding Ugandan sugar trucks entering the country. As a result, contentious interstate trade issues multiplied through the beginning of 2013, and the EAC secretariat had to step in early April.
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The hot-cold relationship between the two also continues to breed collusive allegations between them. In 2011, the United Nations released a report that a Ugandan rebel group, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which was then recruiting al-Shabaab militants from Somalia and aiming to overthrow President Museveni, had been using Nairobi as its financial center. difficult for fishers from either country to sell their catch in markets of the other without risking illegal impromptu taxes from the authorities. 89 Like in the Korean-Japanese case, the territorial dispute has bolstered and added to the underlying elements of rivalry between the countries; indeed it has become part of the rivalry, in addition to other supposedly settle diplomatic and spatial rows. Kenya and Uganda may continue to have a relatively stable relationship despite these tendencies, including steady trade between the two, but the divergence between the two has proven itself able to crop up suddenly with new issues and inspire hostile threats and calls to arms against the neighbor. It would behoove us to account for such developments when we label international rivalries. Colaresi et al, 2007 . Strategic Rivalries 94 Mitchell and Thies, 2011. "Issue Rivalries" slow to recognize these relationships as rivalries because, given the circumstances, they seem unlikely to escalate into armed conflict. However, the inclusion in the term "rivalry" of the probability of conflict explicitly made by Valeriano 95 taints the utility of the concept at all. The data needs to be allowed to speak for itself, and our scholarship should not ascribe the outcome we aim to determine-likelihood of conflict-to the definition itself.
REVISING THE RIVALRY MEASURES
Another response to these two cases might be that they merely lie in the error term, giving no proven indication of a grand bias that runs through the whole literature. If there is a bias running through the literature, Korea/Japan and Kenya/Uganda do not demonstrate it singlehandedly. Rather, these two cases ought to be considered exploratory, demonstrating the potential abundance of signs of rivalrous competition before armed conflict breaks out.
Additionally, they manifest symptoms of rivalry we ought to start paying attention to in our assessment.
Rivalry needs to be pulled back to its conventional definition of simple competition for the same objective, regardless of whether is manifests violence or not. In reconsidering rivalry, it may be helpful to look to two familiar forms of rivalry: sibling and sports. Sports rivalries occur in a context of routine competition: teams, which exist to compete, are systematically matched against each other to determine which is superior. The international system may be anarchic, but the underlying rule of rivalry has been that competition is not inevitable. Its root has been the observation that the majority of conflicts do not occur randomly, but rather between relatively few dyads. 96 So if competition is conceptualized as conflict, then we cannot assume universal competition. The second metaphor, sibling rivalry, is much more useful. Competition for superiority is not inevitable between siblings, and rivalry arises through their own choices. There 95 Valeriano, 2012 . "Becoming Rivalries" 96 Diehl and Goertz, 2000. War and Peace in International Rivalry is no "zero-sum game" in sibling rivalry except the one they create, and the context in which two compete is normally their own device. It may be driven by desire for superiority in the eyes of parents, or merely each other's eyes, but entrance into competition is originally elected. In the metaphor of sibling rivalry, the violent exchange of blows between siblings would reflect the I propose a series of changes to way the field describes and determines rivalry between states. Instead of basing our rivalry measures entirely on conflict-past, present, or future-we should revise them to be founded in indices of geography, economic, diplomatic, and national cohesion, and military conflict, between states. These indices should be kept distinct from each other so that each aspect of a given rivalry can be weighed against the other, and patterns detected.
The core argument here is that rivalry in international relations ought to conform to its conventional definition as competition. In the interstate context, this competition may still be most strongly manifested militarily, but when such competition is preceded by economic, diplomatic, or identity-related forms, we ought to be equipped to detect it. Domestic interests, explicitly excluded at this point in all measures, or dismissed as inconsequential, are often pivotal in escalating international competition. A fishermen's rivalry can relight flames long extinguished, and trade wars can lead to real wars. The risk of including seemingly irrelevant forms of competition between states disappears if all forms of competition are taken to be salient.
Rivalry is competition and ought to be defined by it.
First, though, the very base of our classification of rivalry needs to take a new form. So far, all measures have had rivalry as a binary measure. A pair of states either had a large enough conflict with enough people killed, or it did not. Either they had enough of these conflicts in the right span of time, or they did not. Either their diplomats called the other a national enemy in the right way, or they did not. This arbitrary nature of this system of classification has had the discourse on a tangential track since its inception. Most of our efforts have been invested not in developing the utility our data on international rivalries towards explaining other facets of international relations, facets like economic exchange and regime evolution, but in a still ongoing disagreement on exactly which current and historical dyads make the cut. Everyone sticks to their own definition and dataset, and works from there. Thus, a distinct lack of cohesion characterizes our literature, and our empirical findings are simply challenged with questions of our choice of data.
Instead of using a dichotomous measure, I propose the development of a continuous measure of rivalry as interstate competition. Colaresi et al characterize the range of state behavior as constituting "a conflict-cooperation continuum" at one point, 97 but they decline to utilize the concept in their development, opting instead for the dichotomous measure based on a threshold of violent interaction and explicit recognition of enmity. A benefit of such a system is that it allows us to track the evolution of democracy over time. The same principal can be applied to rivalry. Instead of indicating a year or date in which a rivalry breaks out suddenly, or is decisively terminated through an official statement or signature, we can monitor rivalries as they wax and wane over time. The tendency for rivalries to oscillate this way is at least partially responsible for the disparity between our current measures, and a continuous system would remedy that. Perhaps it is far-fetched to expect that such a set-up would eliminate the division in the field about which dyads are or are not rivals, but it would certainly provide scholars who have other questions about rivalry a more inclusive method of identifying the relationships they seek to test.
Second, we need to justify measuring rivalry dyadically or else allow for the possibility of monadic measures. Cross-state perceptions and levels of animosity are not always 98 One possible method of quantifying this element might be through attendance and viewership at specific international events, as well as media coverage within the countries in question. In some cases, counting the deaths and injuries inflicted between fans at matches may also be an apt measure. Rarely do national rivalries manifest themselves in ways more visible than through international sporting events, which provide us with a useful, if somewhat flawed, window into national sentiment.
Fourth, some short provision for geographic contiguity or proximity would need to be made in these measures. It is well-established, 105 perhaps plain intuitive, that states next to each other interact more, yielding a greater volume of both positive and negative impressions.
National groups next to each other know each other better and have more mature impressions and feelings about each other. There is more trade and generally more exchange of every type between neighbors, so observations would probably have to be weighted differently depending on proximity.
Finally, it would be remiss to outright reject all that rivalry research has yielded so far, in terms of both theory and empirics. Thus, the fifth index I propose here, perhaps the most informative, is founded upon the measures of rivalry we already have. The number and intensity of conflicts between states has certainly been shown to indicate rivalry between states by most of the authors cited so far. To fit in this rivalry index, the previous measures would still need to accommodate a continuous classification, so a lot of data would probably remain to be collected and classified. Through the rivalry data already available and data to be gathered, variables such as time since last conflict, amount killed in last conflict, frequency of last conflict, display of military force, declarations of war, and relative military capability could all inform the way we weigh rivalry.
With our notion of rivalry founded on more than simple occurrence of conflict, we will be better equipped to answer questions about how it affects other aspects of international relations.
CONCLUSION
Our current method of identifying rivalry between states is flawed. We depend on the occurrence of conflict to tell us whether a pair of stsates are rivals, when the likelihood of conflict is that which we seek to predict and explain. Meanwhile, the main topic of discussion and development has not been as substantive as it could be, and much energy has been wasted on defining arbitrary temporal and spatial boundaries for the determination of rivalries. As a result, after two decades of research, there is still relatively little agreement on which current and historical dyads constitute rivals, proto-rivals, or any other pre-rivalry category of relationship. In addition, there are clear examples of dyads that have at least some elements of rivalry, whether self-proclaimed or merely acted out, but which are overlooked entirely by our dominant methods of identification. These dyads may even be generating new issues of contention, the precursor to armed conflict, but our current framework does not allow us to recognize them for their competitive relationship. In short, we have been basing our identification of rivalry almost entirely on the last domino to fall. We do this even while we have volumes of theory and extensive data that can support more robust, intuitive, and exhaustive methods of classifying rivalries.
To rectify this tautological dilemma, we ought to implement three changes. First, we should cease identifying rivalries as binary: by forcing interstate relationships to be either 1s or 0s, we not only perpetuate the further fragmentation and disagreement on identifying rivalries, we also make it much more difficult to track the evolution of rivalries. Second, we should cease identifying rivalries as strictly dyadic: as it is now, unrequited rivalries are undetectable. States often have unequal evaluations of the relationship between them, and we ought to allow for the possibility of lop-sided rivalries. This has implications for the framing of the definition, but we should allow the possibility in any case. Third, we should incorporate non-military measures into our identification of rivalry. This would allow us to cross-examine the multiple facets of rivalry, as well as test them against other aspects of interstate relations.
Making these changes to our methods of identification will require an incredible amount of time and a highly concerted effort. It might also implicate retesting many of the hypotheses we already have. To embrace this lofty challenge, however, would be to enhance the explanatory ability of our theories of rivalry and expand them to answer question of how certain aspects of interstate competitiveness affect others, and ultimately anticipate conflict. Refining our definition of rivalry and revising our modes of measurement would constitute a leap forward in detecting relational preludes to conflict, and hence would better serve the original purpose of discussing rivalry-predicting and explaining patterns of conflict.
